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JUDICIAL SCRUTINY OF NATIVE AMERICAN FREE 
EXERCISE RIGHTS: LYNG AND THE DECLINE OF 
THE YODER DOCTRINE 
Joshua D. Rievman* 
[T]he danger to the continued existence of an ancient religious faith 
cannot be ignored simply because of the assumption that its adherents 
will continue to be able, at considerable sacrifice, to relocate in some 
more tolerant State or country or work out accommodations under 
threat of criminal prosecution. Forced migration of religious minorities 
was an evil that lay at the heart of the Religion Clauses. 
Wisconsin v. Yoder! 
Even if we assume that we should accept the Ninth Circuit's predic-
tion, according to which the [road through the Indians' sacred land] 
will "virtually destroy the Indians' ability to practice their religion," 
(citations omitted) the Constitution simply does not provide a principle 
that could justify upholding respondents' [request to enjoin the build-
ing of that road]. 
Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Association2 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In Wisconsin v. Yoder, the Supreme Court stated that the free 
exercise clause of the first amendment to the United States Consti-
tution forbids governmental action prejudicing the rights of a reli-
gious minority.:3 The Court has applied this standard to several West-
ern-style religions, including the Amish, 4 the Seventh Day 
* Executive Editor, 1989-90, BOSTON COLLEGE ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS LAW REVIEW 
1406 U.S. 205, 218 n.9 (1972). 
2 108 S. Ct. 1319, 1326-27 (1988). 
3 See Yoder, 406 U.S. at 218. 
4 Yoder, 406 U.S. 205. 
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Adventists,5 and the Jehovah's Witnesses. 6 These same justices, 
along with their brethren on the circuit courts of appeals, however, 
have refused on five occasions to extend this doctrine to Native 
American Indians. 7 In each of these instances, the courts either 
refused to reach the Yoder test or resolved that test in favor of a 
governmental body whose land management plan threatened to ren-
der traditional Indian worship impossible. 8 
Most recently, the Supreme Court refused to apply the Yoder test 
in Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Association.9 In 
Lyng, three California Native American Indian tribes sought to 
enjoin the United States Forest Service from building a non-essential 
road on federally owned land sacred to those tribes.lO By refusing 
to apply the strict scrutiny standard of protection developed by 
Yoder and its progeny, the Court ignored an opportunity to overrule 
similar decisions by the circuit courts. More significantly, the Court 
eschewed the Yoder test in favor of the low-scrutiny minimum ra-
tionality test promUlgated by a three-justice plurality decision in 
Bowen v. Roy.ll The Lyng precedent renders unlikely future suc-
cessful suits by Native American Indians asserting their religious 
rights against federal land management policies. 
5 Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n, 480 U.S. 136 (1987); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 
U.S. 398 (1963). 
6 Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707 (1981) (plurality opinion). 
7 Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 108 S. Ct. 1319 (1988); Wilson v. 
Block, 708 F.2d 735 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 956 (1983); Badoni V. Higginson, 638 
F.2d 172 (10th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 954 (1981); Sequoyah V. Tennessee Valley 
Auth., 620 F.2d 1159 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 953 (1980); Crow V. Gullet, 706 F.2d 
856 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 977 (1983). 
8 In Lyng, the Court reversed the district court holding prohibiting the Forest Service from 
building a road on Indian sacred land and remanded the case for proceedings consistent with 
its opinion. 108 S. Ct. at 1330. In Wilson v. Block, the Forest Service was allowed to grant 
permits to build a ski area on a holy mountain. 708 F.2d at 737-38. In Sequoyah, the TVA 
was allowed to flood holy land, 620 F.2d at 1160-61, and in Badoni the Interior Department 
was similarly permitted to flood holy land. 638 F.2d at 176. In Crow, the State of South 
Dakota was permitted to build tourist facilities on sacred land. 706 F.2d at 857-58. 
9108 S. Ct. at 1329 (distinguishing Yoder on the grounds that Yoder involved a statute that 
was coercive in nature). 
10 [d. at 1322. 
11 .476 U.S. 693 (1986). In Bowen V. Roy, the Supreme Court refused to enjoin the Depart-
ment of Health and Human Services from disseminating a social security number for the 
plaintiffs' child. The plaintiffs, Native American Indians, claimed that the assignment of such 
a number was contrary to their religious beliefs and violated their free exercise rights. 
The Court declined to apply the Yoder test, which would require the government to show 
that the issuance of a social security number accomplished a compelling governmental purpose 
by the least restrictive means availible. [d. at 707. Rather, the Court only required that the 
government prove its action was a "reasonable means of promoting a legitimate public inter-
est." [d. at 708. 
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In its examination of the federal courts' treatment of land-based 
Native American religious claims, this Comment argues that the 
courts improperly decided Lyng and several circuit court cases. The 
decision in Lyng was inconsistent with the Supreme Court's estab-
lished free exercise doctrine. Moreover, the Court applied improper 
reasoning in Lyng in light of the specific nature of the Native Amer-
ican claims. 
This Comment asserts that courts apply a different standard to 
claims made by Western-style religious groups than to similar claims 
made by Native Americans. This dichotomy is arguably the result 
of institutional racism that prevents judges schooled in Western 
thought from fully appreciating and understanding Native American 
religions and their requirements. While the courts state their accep-
tance of the Native Americans' sincere beliefs, their attempts to 
distinguish the Indians' claims from those of Western religious 
groups belie those assurances. 
Section II of this Comment examines the uniqueness of Native 
American religions. 12 Section III of this Comment explores the Su-
preme Court doctrine developed to evaluate the free exercise clause 
claims. This section addresses the balancing test articulated in Yoder 
and the tension that exists between the free exercise and establish-
ment clauses. 13 Section IV of this Comment discusses congressional 
and executive action affecting Native American rights, including the 
American Indian Religions Freedom Act and federal land manage-
ment policies. 14 Section V of this Comment analyzes the courts' 
treatment of cases involving federal land use decisions that threaten 
Native American Indians' free exercise rights.15 Finally, this Com-
ment suggests that the results in these cases would change if the 
courts accorded the same treatment to Indians' claims as they do to 
claims of adherents to Western religions. 16 
II. THE UNIQUENESS OF INDIAN RELIGIONS 
European settlers have mistrusted and misunderstood Indian re-
ligions since their first encounter with Native American culture over 
300 years ago. 17 Sacred geography lies at the heart of the differences 
12 See infra notes 17--35 and accompanying text. 
13 See infra notes 36-107 and accompanying text. 
14 See infra notes 134-40 and accompanying text. 
15 See infra notes 141-213 and accompanying text. 
16 See infra notes 248-54 and accompanying text. 
17 See generally United States Civil Rights Commission, Religion in the Constitution: A 
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between American Indian and Western religions. 18 Western religions 
build churches, mosques, and synagogues in order to designate holy 
sites. Indian religions, on the other hand, hold the land itself holy. 19 
It is not uncommon for a tree, a rock, or a mountain to be an Indian 
holy site. 20 
In some Indian religions, the land itself represents a deity of the 
highest order. In Wilson v. Block, for example, the Navajo and Hopi 
tribes sued the Interior Department because the Indians considered 
the mountain on which Interior planned to permit a ski area a deity, 
as well as home to their creator's emissaries. 21 As the Circuit Court 
of Appeals for the District of Columbia observed, 
[The Navajos] believe the [San Francisco] Peaks to be the home 
of specific deities and consider the Peaks to be the body of a 
spiritual being or god, with various peaks forming the head, 
shoulders, and knees of a body reclining and facing to the east, 
while the trees, plants, rocks and earth form the skin. 22 
The tribes viewed the construction of a ski area as an affront to their 
creator. 23 
Delicate Balance 27-28 (1983) [hereinafter Civil Rights Commission Report]. For an inter-
esting discussion on the history of United States government-Native American relations, see 
generally Note, Native American Control of Natural Resources Development in the Context 
of the Federal Trust and Tribal Self-determination, 16 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 857 (1989). 
18 See, e.g., Civil Rights Commission Report, supra note 17, at 30. See generally Brief of 
Amici Curiae for Respondents at 8-16, Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 
108 S. Ct. 1319 (1988) (No. 86-1013) [hereinafter Lyng Brief]; D. E. Walker, Protection of 
American Indian Sacred Geography: Toward a Functional Understanding of Indian Religion 
Focusing on a Protective Standard of Integrity, reprinted in Lyng Brief, supra, at Appendix' 
A; Note, American Indian Sacred Religious Sites and Government Development: A Conven-
tional Analysis in an Unconventional Setting, 85 MICH. L. REV. 771 (1987); Stambor, Man-
ifest Destiny and American Indian Religious Freedom: Sequoyah, Badoni and The Drowned 
Gods, 10 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 59 (1982). 
19 Civil Rights Commission Report, supra note 17, at 30. 
20 As a former Navajo Legal Services attorney testified, 
[T]he Navajo people ... don't go out and build ... churches at every place they 
regard as holy. The sites that can be of religious importance to them may be utterly 
indistinguishable to us as such ... a particular bush, a rock, a rise in the landscape 
... these sites and beliefs that are associated with them provide ... a very basic 
premise [for an] entire way of life. 
Civil Rights Commission Report, supra note 17, at 30 (testimony of Richard Hughes, former 
Navajo Legal Services attorney, before the New Mexico Advisory Committee to the United 
States Commission on Civil Rights, "Open Meeting on the Impact of Energy Development on 
Minorities Women and the Elderly in Northwestern New Mexico," Grants, New Mexico, Apr. 
3-4, 1981, transcript, vol. 1., at 59). 
21 708 F.2d 735, 738-39 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 956 (1983). These emissaries are 
known as Kachinas. Id. 
22 I d. at 738. 
'2:J Id. 
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Sacred Indian lands often serve as the only place where a partic-
ular religious ceremony can be performed. 24 Some commentators 
note that Indian religions are site-specific because of the Indians' 
perception of the land as a living deity.25 Thus, if Native Americans 
are no longer able to perform both group and personal rituals at a 
specific site, it is entirely possible that they would abandon these 
rituals. As Justice Brennan observed in his dissent in Lyng, land is 
not fungible within the Native American belief system. 26 
The second factor distinguishing Native American religions from 
Western religions is the former's lack of dogma and doctrine. 27 Land 
use replaces dogma as the center of faith. 28 Native Americans do not 
allow interpretation or commentary of their ceremonies. 29 Native 
American rituals do not represent or commemorate a doctrine of 
religious beliefs. Rather, "the value [of the ceremonies] lies ... in 
their efficacy as protectors and enhancers of tribal existence. "30 The 
ceremonies performed are part of an ongoing creative process and 
are vital not only to the future well-being of tribal members, but 
also to the continued protection of the earth. 31 Perhaps this factor, 
more than any other, makes it difficult for non-Indians to understand 
Native American religions. 
Finally, unlike most Western religions,32 Native American reli-
gions are not limited to a discrete sphere of Indian life. 33 Native 
American worship cannot be distinguished from the social, political, 
and cultural aspects of Indian lifestyle. 34 The pervasiveness of Indian 
24 See, e.g., 123 CONGo REC. SI9,766-67 (Dec. 15, 1977) (remarks of Senator Abourezk); 
Walker, supra note IS, at 6-7, 12-21. 
25 See Suagee, American Indian Religious Freedom and Cultural Resources Management: 
Protecting Mother Earth's Caretakers, 10 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 1, 10 (19S2), cited in Lyng v. 
Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, lOS S. Ct. 1319, 1331 (19SS) (Brennan, J., 
dissenting). 
26 lOS S. Ct. at 1331 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
27 Walker, supra note 18, at 6-7. 
28 Lyng, lOS S. Ct. at 1331 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
29 Id. (citing U.S. Federal Agencies Task Force, American Indian Religious Freedom Act 
Report 11 (1979)); see also Walker, supra note IS, at 12--24. 
30 Lyng, lOS S. Ct. at 1331 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
31 ld. (citing United States Federal Agencies Task Force, American Indian Religious 
Freedom Act Report 10-11 (1979)). 
32 The Amish religion is a notable exception. As Justice Burger pointed out in Wisconsin v. 
Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 216 (1972), the Amish religion pervades every aspect of the life of its 
adherents. 
33 Lyng, 108 S. Ct. at 1331 (Brennan, J. dissenting) (quoting American Indian Religious 
Freedom, Hearings on S.J.R. 102 Before the Senate Select Committee on Indian Affairs, 
95th Cong., 2d Sess. S6 (1978) [hereinafter AIRFA Hearings] (statement of Barney Old Coyote 
of the Crow Tribe)). 
34 AIRFA Hearings, supra note 33, at S6 (statement of Barney Old Coyote of the Crow 
Tribe). 
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religion in Indian life makes the link between tribal religious life and 
tribal social structure inextricable. Indeed, in bringing claims under 
the free exercise clause, Indian plaintiffs often assert that the loss 
of spiritual life will result in the destruction of the tribe's very social 
fabric. 35 
III. SUPREME COURT ANALYSIS OF CLAIMS UNDER THE FIRST 
AMENDMENT'S FREE EXERCISE CLAUSE 
A. The Free Exercise Clause 
The free exercise clause of the first amendment to the United 
States Constitution states: "Congress shall make no law ... prohib-
iting the free exercise [of religion],"36 The Supreme Court has used 
the free exercise clause to protect the rights of many groups from 
governmental laws and actions. 37 The Supreme Court and the lower 
federal courts, however, have consistently failed to uphold the first 
amendment rights of Native American Indians when asserted in 
opposition to the federal government's use of federally owned land. 38 
In adjudicating free exercise claims, the Supreme Court applies a 
strict scrutiny test to governmental laws or actions that allegedly 
prejudice a party's free exercise rights. 39 In order to obtain relief, 
the party must show that the law or governmental action in question 
burdens a sincere religious belief.40 Once this burden is established, 
the government must show that the law or action serves a compelling 
interest.41 If the government cannot make such a showing, then the 
party's free exercise rights must prevail. 42 
35 See, e.g., Lyng, 108 S. Ct. 1319; Wilson v. Block, 708 F.2d 735 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 
464 U.S. 956 (1983); Sequoyah v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 620 F.2d 1159 (6th Cir.), cert. 
denied, 449 U.S. 953 (1980). 
36 U.S. CONST. amend. 1. 
37 See, e.g., Thomas v. Review Ed., 450 U.S. 707 (1981) (plurality opinion); Yoder v. 
Wisconsin, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963). 
38 See, e.g., Lyng 108 S. Ct. 1319; Sherbert, 374 U.S. 398; Wilson, 708 F.2d 735. 
39 See, e.g., Thomas, 450 U.S. 707; Yoder, 406 U.S. 205; Sherbert, 374 U.S. 398. 
40 Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 403-04. 
41 Thomas, 450 U.S. at 718. 
42 In addition to conducting a free exercise analysis, courts must also analyze these claims 
on the basis of the establishment clause of the first amendment, which prohibits the govern-
ment from taking action that encourages the establishment of a religion. U.S. CONST. amend. 
1. Although the Supreme Court has not spoken definitively on this matter, some judges, such 
as Chief Justice Rehnquist, feel that the Court has expanded both the free exercise and 
establishment clauses too far and has placed them on a collision course. See Thomas, 450 U.S. 
at 720-27 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Other judges, however, have held that, even 
though there is a fine line between promoting a religion and allowing free exercise of a religion, 
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The modern free exercise doctrine originated in Sherbert v. Ver-
ner.43 In Sherbert, the Court held that governmental action or con-
duct is impermissible if its purpose or effect is to impede the ob-
servance of a religion44 or to discriminate invidiously between 
religions. 45 This holding should apply, the Court stated, even if the 
burden is only indirect. 46 
In Sherbert, the plaintiff, a Seventh Day Adventist, was fired from 
her job because she would not work on Saturdays, her religion's 
Sabbath. 47 When she was unable to obtain other work, the plaintiff 
applied to the State of South Carolina for unemployment benefits, 
pursuant to state law. 48 The State denied plaintiff benefits on the 
basis that she was not "available for work"49 as required by statute. 
Writing for the Court, Justice Brennan outlined an analysis for 
assessing free exercise claims. First, the court must judge whether 
a governmental action burdens an individual's exercise of religion. 50 
Second, the court must determine whether the action coerces or 
pressures the individual to forego or engage in a particular religious 
practice. 51 
If the court finds undue burden, pressure, or coercion, it must 
next consider whether the governmental entity has some compelling 
interest in enforcing the provision. 52 Justice Brennan urged that, in 
balancing such a compelling interest against the burden imposed on 
the free exercise right, a court should not accept a law or action that 
has merely a rational relationship to a colorable state interest. 53 
Rather, free exercise rights may only be limited in the protection of 
some paramount governmental interest. 54 
A decade later, the Court reaffirmed the Sherbert doctrine in 
Wisconsin v. Yoder55 by invalidating a Wisconsin statute requiring 
excepting a politically powerless minority from a statutory requirement clearly does not violate 
the establishment clause. See, e.g., Thomas, 450 U.S. at 719-20; Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 409. 
43 374 U.S. 398 (1963). 
44 [d. at 404 (quoting Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 607 (1961». 
45 [d. at 404; see also Lyng Brief, supra note 17, at 22. 
46 Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 404 (quoting Braunfeld, 366 U.S. at 607). 
47 [d. at 399. 
48 [d. at 400. 
49 [d. (quoting S.C. CODE § 68-113(3». 
50 [d. at 403. 
51 [d. at 404. 
52 [d. at 406. 
53 [d. 
54 "Only the gravest abuses, endangering paramount interests, give occasion for permissible 
limitation." [d. (quoting Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530 (1945». 
55 406 U.S. 205 (1972). 
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compulsory school education for children through age sixteen. 56 In 
Yoder, a group of Amish parents challenged the law, claiming that 
their religion required them to educate their fourteen- to sixteen-
year-old children at home, and that the Wisconsin law denied them 
their right to exercise their religious beliefs as they saw fit. 57 The 
Court recognized that, although educating its citizens ranks at the 
very apex of a state's responsibilities, the plaintiffs nonetheless dem-
onstrated a sufficient burden to require a balancing test. 58 The Court 
then balanced the Amish parents' free exercise interests against the 
State's interest in public education. 59 
In performing this balancing test, the Yoder Court concluded that 
the values taught in modern secondary schools conflicted with Amish 
values. 60 Further, the Court concluded that, because the Amish 
religion is several hundred years old and is not restricted to a dis-
crete sphere of Amish life,61 compulsory school attendance through 
age sixteen for Amish children carried with it a real threat of un-
dermining the existence of the Amish community religion. 62 Under 
the Wisconsin statute, the Amish had to either abandon their belief 
and become assimilated into society at large, or migrate to some 
more tolerant state. 63 Thus, the Yoder Court held that Amish values 
outweighed the State's interest in education, reasserting that the 
Sherbert balancing test was appropriate and resolving that test in 
favor of the free exercise rights of the Amish. 
'".Id. at 207. 
57 See id. at 215-19. 
58 The Court stated: 
[A] State's interest in universal education, however highly we rank it, is not totally 
free from a balancing process when it impinges on fundamental rights and interests, 
such as those specifically protected by the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amend-
ment, and the traditional interest of parents with respect to the religious upbringing 
of their children so long as they ... "prepare [them] for additional obligations." 
Id. at 214 (quoting Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925)). 
591d. at 213-14. 
60 Id. at 217. Among the qualities of Amish life with which modern schools conflict, according 
to Chief Justice Burger, is the group's attachment to nature and the soil. Id. 
61 Indeed, Amish religion is intertwined with all aspects of Amish social structure, much 
the way Indian culture and religion are inseparable. See supra notes 33-35 and accompanying 
text. 
62 Yoder, 406 U.S. at 218. Chief Justice Burger wrote, 
Id. 
Compulsory school attendance to age 16 for Amish children carries with it a very 
real threat of undermining the Amish community and religious practice as they exist 
today; they must either abandon belief and be assimilated into society at large, or 
be forced to migrate to some other and more tolerant region. 
63 I d. at 218. 
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The Court further defined the free exercise doctrine in Thomas v. 
Review Board. 64 Thomas concerned a Jehovah's Witness who worked 
in a foundry.65 When Thomas's job was eliminated, he was trans-
ferred to a weapons producing division. 66 Weapons production con-
flicted with his religious tenets. 67 The employer could not arrange 
another transfer and consequently Thomas quit. 68 Thomas applied 
for unemployment compensation benefits under the Indiana Employ-
ment Security Act. 69 A referee denied the application because 
Thomas's termination was not based upon good cause relating to his 
work. 70 
Chief Justice Burger, who had fashioned the Yoder decision nearly 
a decade earlier, wrote for the Thomas court. Burger emphasized 
that only religious, rather than mere philosophical beliefs, are pro-
tected by the free exercise clause.71 The Court overruled the Indiana 
Supreme Court's decision that Thomas's reason was not truly a 
religious one. 72 Burger noted that the Indiana court had based its 
decision on evidence showing that Thomas was struggling with his 
beliefs. According to the Indiana court, this struggle showed his 
beliefs to be poorly articulated and, thus, not deserving of first 
amendment protection. 73 According to Burger, this evidence actually 
revealed nothing more than that Thomas's decision regarding what 
did or did not offend his beliefs was a difficult one. 74 
Inquiry into the legitimacy of Thomas's conclusions, Burger con-
tinued, is beyond a court's domain. It is not the Court's role to 
dissect a person's religious beliefs simply because that person is 
struggling with these beliefs or because the person has difficulty 
articulating his or her views. 75 The Court also held that intra-faith 
64 450 u.s. 707 (1981). 
65 Id. at 710. 
66 Id. 
G7Id. 
68 Id. 
69Id. (citing IND. CODE § 22-4-1-1 (1976 & Supp. 1978». 
70 I d. at 712. 
71 I d. at 713. 
72 Id. at 715-16. 
73 I d. at 715. 
74Id. 
75 Id.; see also United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78 (1944). In Ballard, the Court held that 
a jury could only determine whether or not a religious belief was sincerely held, but not 
whether it was true. In contrast, Professor Tribe suggests that even an inquiry into the 
sincerity of a party's religious beliefs is dangerous, because any judgment of sincerity is bound 
to be affected by a judge or a jury's qualitative evaluation of the religious claim. L. TRIBE, 
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (2d ed. 1988), § 14-12, 1244-45. 
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differences about what conduct is scripturally acceptable were not 
fatal to Thomas's claim. 76 
Thomas also articulated a further requirement of the free exercise 
balancing test. In addition to requiring a compelling governmental 
interest, the Court held that the government must accommodate this 
interest by the least restrictive means available. 77 This requirement, 
always implicit in the Court's analysis, was not expressly declared 
until Thomas. 
In refining the free exercise doctrine, the Court reaffirmed the 
Yoder burden and balancing test in Thomas. 78 As in Yoder, the Court 
defined the balancing test as a test in which only a government 
interest of the highest order will prevail over legitimate claims to 
the free exercise of religion. 79 In Thomas, the Court considered 
neither an interest in the unemployment compensation fund's con-
tinued viability nor reluctance to put prospective employers to the 
task of probing into people's religious beliefs as interests of para-
mount importance. 80 
In contrast, in Bowen v. Roy81 the Court refused to uphold a 
party's free exercise rights and did not reach the Yoder balancing 
test. In Bowen, the plaintiffs, Native American Indians, disputed 
federal statutes and pract~ces that required welfare program partic-
ipants to provide state welfare agencies with the social security 
numbers of each member of their household. 82 The plaintiffs based 
their claim on the free exercise clause, stating that this practice 
violated their religious beliefs because obtaining a social security 
number for their two-year-old daughter, Little Bird of the Snow,83 
would rob her of her spirit and thus prevent her from gaining greater 
spiritual power. 84 
Eight justices joined in reversing the district court's injunction. 
The injunction had prevented the Department of Health and Human 
Services from disseminating a social security number referring to 
the plaintiffs' daughter. 85 The injunction had also required the state 
76 Thomas, 450 U.S. at 715. 
77 I d. at 718. 
781d. 
791d. 
80 I d. at 719. 
81 476 U.S. 693 (1986). 
82 I d. at 695. 
83 Id. 
84 I d. at 696. 
85 I d. at 701. 
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and federal agencies responsible for administering the plaintiffs' wel-
fare benefits to make those payments. The Court denied the injunc-
tion in Bowen because, in its view, the free exercise clause does not 
require the federal government to conduct its internal affairs in ways 
that comport with the religious beliefs of particular citizens. 86 Justice 
Burger, writing for the Court, likened the plaintiffs' claim to a 
request that the government use different colored filing cabinets. 87 
Refusing to find that the governmental action violated the free ex-
ercise clause, the Court never reached the balancing test mandated 
by Sherbert and Yoder.88 
Only two justices, however, concurred with the Chief Justice in 
the portion of his opinion that refused to extend the Yoder test to 
this case. 89 The Burger group, departing from the precedent estab-
lished in Thomas90 and its antecedents, argued that the government 
need not prove that its actions constituted the least restrictive al-
ternative. 91 Burger wrote that the appropriate standard was mini-
mum rationality, a test in which the government must prove merely 
a rational basis for its action. 92 
Five justices expressly rejected this portion of Burger's argu-
ment. 93 Writing for herself and two others,94 Justice O'Connor ar-
gued that the precedent set by Sherbert, Yoder, and Thomas re-
quired a strict scrutiny standard that demands that the government 
provide more than a rational basis to justify its action. 95 O'Connor 
admonished that "[o]nly an especially important government interest 
pursued by narrowly tailored means can justify exacting a sacrifice 
86 I d. at 699. 
87Id. at 700. 
88 The Chief Justice found that the Yoder balancing test would be inappropriate because the 
government is entitled to "wide latitude" in enforcing a facially neutral, uniformly applicable 
requirement in administering welfare programs reaching millions of people. Id. at 707. Never-
theless, Yoder also concerned the enforcement of a uniformly applicable, facially neutral 
progrl'm for the public welfare (mandatory public education). 
89 Only Justices Powell and Rehnquist joined the Chief Justice in Part III of his opinion. 
Id. at 695. 
90 See supra notes 64-80 and accompanying text. 
91 Bowen, 476 U.S. at 707 (Burger, C.J.) (plurality opinion). 
92 See id. at 707-08. 
93 Justices Marshall and Brennan joined Justice O'Connor's dissenting opinion. Id. at 724-
33. Justices Blackmun and Stevens agreed with Justice O'Connor's view in their separate 
opinions. Id. at 712-16 (Blackmun, J., concurring), 716-23 (Stevens, J., concurring). Justice 
White, relying on the precedent set by Thomas and Sherbert, tersely dissented in full. Id. at 
733. 
94 See supra note 93. 
95Id. at 728 (O'Connor, J., dissenting in part). 
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of First Amendment freedoms as the price for an equal share of the 
rights, benefits, and privileges enjoyed by other citizens."96 
Justice O'Connor concurred only with the overruling of that por-
tion of the district court's injunction which prohibited the issuing of 
a social security number.97 Her concurring and dissenting opinion 
concluded that: the governmental action burdened the plaintiffs' free 
exercise rights;98 the government met its burden in showing that 
welfare fraud prevention is a compelling goal;99 and the government 
could prevail only if it used a narrowly tailored means of meeting its 
compelling goal. IOO Ultimately, five justices agreed with this analy-
SiS. lOI 
Recently, the Court took the opportunity to reaffirm its free ex-
ercise clause doctrine in a case factually similar to both Thomas and 
Sherbert. In Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Commission,I02 the 
plaintiff, Hobbie, was discharged from her job when she refused to 
work on Saturdays following her recent conversion to the Seventh 
Day Adventist Church. 103 The unemployment appeals commission 
denied the plaintiff unemployment benefits because it determined 
that she was discharged for misconduct connected with her work. 104 
The Court upheld the precedent established by Sherbert and Thomas 
and ruled that the Florida Review Board's action violated Hobbie's 
free exercise rights. 105 
In rejecting the State's argument, the Court distinguished Hob-
bie's factual situation from that presented in Bowen, and expressly 
rejected the minimum scrutiny standard that Chief Justice Burger 
promUlgated in his plurality opinion. 106 Quoting Justice O'Connor's 
separate opinion in Bowen, the Court observed that such a test had 
00 [d. 
97 [d. at 732-33 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part). "[Tlhe District Court's injunction was 
overbroad in preventing the Government from using information already in its possession." 
[d. at 724. 
98 See id. at 727-28. 
99 [d. at 732. 
100 [d. 
101 See id. at 733 (White, J., dissenting) (Justice White dissented from the entire judgment, 
citing Thomas and Sherbert as controlling); id. at 715-16 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part) 
(Justice Blackmun agreed that Thomas provided the appropriate standard and explained that 
he would adopt Justice O'Connor's resolution of the issues if the district court reached them 
on remand). 
102 480 U.S. 136 (1986). 
103 [d. at 138. 
104 [d. (quoting FLA. STAT. § 443.101(1)(a)). 
105 [d. at 139-40. 
106 [d. at 141. 
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no basis in precedent and accorded the lowest level of judicial scru-
tiny available to an important first amendment right. 107 
B. The Carolene Products Footnote 
Underlying all of the free exercise cases is a concern for the 
protection of minority interests against majoritarian control. Thus, 
when a court decides whether or not to apply the free exercise 
clause, it first must determine the status of the party claiming the 
violation of rights. Pursuant to footnote four of United States v. 
Carolene Products Co., 108 if that party belongs to a politically pow-
erless "discrete and insular minorit[y]"109 and prejudice seriously 
curtails the operation of those political processes that minorities 
ordinarily rely upon, 110 a court must accord that party a more search-
ing judicial inquiry. III The Supreme Court adhered to this dicta, 
known as the Carolene Products footnote, several times in the en-
suing decade, 112 and its mandate has profoundly affected the outcome 
of numerous first and fourteenth amendment suits. 113 
IV. CONGRESSIONAL AND EXECUTIVE ACTION AFFECTING 
NATIVE AMERICAN RIGHTS 
A. The American Indian Religious Freedom Act 
In addition to the free exercise doctrine, several statutes affect 
the executive's decisions regarding Native Americans. Concerned 
with the executive's and the judiciary's reluctance to protect Native 
American religious rights, Congress passed the American Indian 
Religious Freedom Act (AIRF A).114 The first section of AIRF A 
dictates that Native American religions should be protected. It pro-
vides, in pertinent part, that: 
107 [d. at 141-42 (quoting Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 727 (1986) (O'Connor, J., dissenting 
in part)). Indeed, the minimum scrutiny is already provided for by the equal protection clause. 
[d. 
108 United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 nA (1938). 
109 [d. 
110 [d. at 153. 
III [d. 
112 See, e.g., Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940); Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 
U.S. 1 (1947). 
113 See, e.g., City of Richmond v. J.A. Cronson Co., 109 S. Ct. 706 (1989); Fullilove v. 
Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978). 
11442 U.S.C. § 1996 (1982). 
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[I]t shall be the policy of the United States to protect and pre-
serve for American Indians their inherent right of freedom to 
believe, express, and exercise the traditional religions of the 
American Indian, Eskimo, Aleut, and Native Hawaiians, includ-
ing but not limited to access to sites, use and possession of sacred 
objects, and the freedom to worship through ceremonies and 
traditional rights. 115 
The second section of AIRF A asserts that Congress intended that 
the statute order federal agencies and other intrumentalities re-
sponsible for administering relevant laws and governmental pro-
grams to evaluate their policies and procedures in consultation with 
Native American leaders. 116 
AIRF A's preamble illustrates Congress's remedial intent. AIRF A 
declares that traditional Native American religions form the basis 
of Indian identity and value systems ll7 and consequently are irre-
placeable. 118 The preamble further states that AIRF A is designed 
to prevent religious infringements that result from a lack of knowl-
edge or from insensitive and inflexible enforcement of federal policies 
and regulations. 119 
The preamble provides examples of situations to which Congress 
intended AIRF A apply. AIRF A seeks to modify the enforcement of 
statutes designed to preserve animal species and natural resources 
that were passed without consideration of their effect on traditional 
Native American religions. 120 AIRF A likewise targets laws and pol-
icies denying Native American Indians access to their sacred sites 
and interfering with or prohibiting the performance of religious rites 
and ceremonies on these sites. 121 
The proceedings of the House of Representatives and Senate Com-
mittees that considered AIRF A reveal Congress's desire to remedy 
the federal government's lack of understanding of Native American 
religion. 122 Once gained, such an understanding would foster Con-
gress's intent to insure that federal agencies formulate and admin-
115 Id. 
116 American Indian Religious Freedom Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-341, § 2, 92 Stat. 470 
(1978). 
117 Id., 92 Stat. 469. 
118Id. 
119Id. 
12°Id. 
121Id. 
122 The bill was initially considered by the Senate Select Committee on Indian Affairs and 
the House of Representatives Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs. 
H.R. REP. No. 1308, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONGo & ADMIN. 
NEWS 1262 (1978); see also S. REP. No. 709, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1978). 
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ister policies that recognize and preserve traditional Indian religious 
practices. In this way, the federal government would be encouraged 
to comply with the free exercise clause's mandate. 123 
Senator Abourezk, one of AIRF A's sponsors and Chairperson of 
the Senate Select Committee on Indian Affairs, opened the Com-
mittee's hearings on AIRF A by criticizing the lack of policy, aware-
ness, and sensitivity that characterized the federal government's 
interaction with traditional Indian religions and cultures. 124 Abour-
ezk blamed this phenomenon on the perception that Indian religions 
are not "real" religions because they differ from Western religions. 125 
The Chairperson introduced AIRF A to encourage public officials to 
recognize that actions impinging on Native American religions affect 
American Indians as intensely as similar actions threatening West-
ern religious practices would impact Protestants, Catholics, or 
Jews. 126 
Senator Matsunaga, also a member of the Indian Affairs Commit-
tee, stressed AIRF A's broad application as a remedial statute. 127 
According to Matsunaga, when AIRF A became effective, it would 
not only require that the federal government and its agencies learn 
about Native American religions, but also that they respect the 
practice of Native American religions. 128 Presumably, respect for the 
practice of Indian religions entails the administration of federal pol-
icy in ways that do not disrupt these religions. 129 
On its face, AIRF A requires the federal government to inform 
itself of, and protect, Native American religions. 13o The language of 
the statute requires the federal government to account for the unique 
nature of Indian religions in administering its policies. In addition, 
the preamble contains examples of situations to which AIRF A will 
apply, and the legislative history reveals AIRF A's broad remedial 
purpose. 131 Because AIRF A requires the government's compliance 
123 H.R. REP. No. 1308, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONGo & 
ADMIN. NEWS 1262 (1978); see also S. REP. No. 709, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1978). 
124 AIRFA Hearings, supra note 33, at 1 (statement of Senator Abourezk, Chairperson, 
Senate Select Committee on Indian Affairs). 
125Id. 
126Id. 
127Id. at 84-85 (statement of Senator Matsunaga). 
128 Id. 
129 Although this point is intuitive, AIRFA provides little specific guidance and is more of 
a policy statement than a statute. 
130 42 U.S.C. § 1996 (1982). 
131 For further discussion of AIRF A's legislative history, see supra notes 117-21 and 
accompanying text. The House report, for instance, gives examples of states that passed laws 
to protect objects sacred to Indian religions, such as eagle feathers and peyote (a hallucinogen 
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and because it is the judiciary's role to enforce congressional stat-
utes, it follows that in adjudicating claims brought pursuant to 
AIRF A, courts should take notice of Congress's intent to protect 
and preserve those religions. 132 
B. Federal Land Management Policy 
In most cases in which Native American free exercise rights con-
flict with federal land management policies, the plaintiff Native 
Americans seek to enjoin the federal government's use of federally 
owned land. 133 Although such cases may seem like an affront to the 
government's sovereignty, the power to manage governmental lands 
is not absolute. Several statutes manifest congressional intent to 
limit the exercise of discretionary power by agencies charged with 
the supervision of federal lands. 134 These statutes, in fact, provide 
additional causes of action for many suits brought by Native Amer-
ican plaintiffs seeking to protect their religious rights, including the 
National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA)135 and the Federal 
Water Pollution Control Act. 136 Additionally, even the narrowest 
reading of statutes such as AIRF A impinge on governmental agency 
discretion in making land management decisions. 137 
For example, environmental statutes, such as NEP A, impose re-
strictions on the Forest Service's use of federally owned land. The 
Ninth Circuit recently held that NEPA section l02(2)(C)138 required 
considered sacred by some Indian tribes). H.R. REP. No. 1308, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 3, 4, 
reprinted in U.S. CODE CONGo & ADMIN. NEWS 1264-65 (1978). 
132 Unlike many statutes, AIRFA is not self-enforcing. It imposes no penalty for non-
compliance and sets no standard of judicial review of federal agencies' decisions. However, 
Congress did not intend that the judiciary allow agencies to ignore AIRF A. AIRF A is, above 
all, a congressional mandate to the executive branch to account for Native American religions 
in policy formulation. Because of the unique nature of Indian religions, see supra notes 17-35 
and accompanying text, courts must take notice of Indian religions in order to decide claims 
brought pursuant to Native American free exercise rights and AIRFA properly. 
133 See, e.g., Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 108 S. Ct. 1319 (1988); 
Wilson v. Block, 708 F.2d 735 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 956 (1983); Crow v. Gullet, 
706 F.2d 856 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 977 (1983). 
134 See, e.g., AIRFA, 42 U.S.C. § 1996 (1982); National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), 
42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370a (1982 & Supp. IV 1986); California Wilderness Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 543-
543h (Supp. IV 1986). 
135 [d. at 1332; 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370a (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). 
136 Lyng, 108 S. Ct. at 1332; 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). While Lyng 
was pending, Congress also passed the California Wilderness Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 543-543h 
(Supp. IV 1986). 
137 AIRFA requires the government to protect Native American religious rights, "including 
[preservation of] access to [religious] sites." 42 U.S.C. § 1996 (1982). 
138 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1982). 
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the Forest Service to prepare a worst-case analysis and mitigation 
plan for the proposed construction of a ski area in the Okanogan 
National Forest in Washington. 139 The Ninth Circuit also ordered 
the Army Corps of Engineers to prepare similar analyses before 
building the Elk Creek Dam on the Rouge River.14o 
While none of these statutes dictate the way in which federal 
agencies must administer their policies, all limit the government's 
discretion in land management decisions. 
V. THE FREE EXERCISE DOCTRINE AND NATIVE AMERICAN 
CLAIMS 
United States courts have often invoked the free exercise clause 
to protect the religious rights of parties. 141 The Supreme Court and 
the federal circuits are reluctant, however, to apply this doctrine to 
the claims of Native American Indian tribes. In Wilson v. Block, 142 
Sequoyah v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 143 Badoni v. Higginson,144 
and Crow v. Gullet,145 the circuit courts of appeal distinguished 
strong Native American claims from Sherbert,146 Yoder,147 and their 
progeny. 148 
In Wilson, the Navajo and Hopi Indians sued the Forest Service 
to prevent it from granting permits allowing expansion of a ski area 
139 Methow Valley Citizens Council v. Regional Forester, 833 F.2d 810, 812--13 (9th Cir. 
1987), cert. granted sub nom. Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 108 S. Ct. 2869 
(1988) (the Okanogan Forest ski area). 
140 Oregon Natural Resources Council v. Marsh, 832 F.2d 1489, 1500 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. 
granted, 108 S. Ct. 2869 (1988). The Court consolidated the Marsh appeal with the Methow 
Valley appeal. 
The Court's enforcement of NEPA informs the discussion of Native American rights in two 
ways. First, the enforcement shows that courts can and should limit the federal government's 
discretion in the use of the land it owns. Second, because Native American claims are also 
brought pursuant to statutes such as NEPA, the laws provide additional means for Indians 
to seek to enjoin governmental action in order to protect their aboriginal lands. 
141 See supra notes 36-107 and accompanying text. 
142 708 F.2d 735 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 956 (1983) (Native Americans denied 
injunction prohibiting the Forest Service from permitting development of a ski area on holy 
land). 
143 620 F.2d 1159 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 953 (1980) (Native Americans denied 
injunction to stop construction of dam that would flood sacred land). 
144 638 F.2d 172 (10th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 954 (1981) (Native Americans denied 
injunction to stop construction of dam that would flood sacred land). 
145 706 F.2d 856 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 977 (1983) (Native Americans denied 
injunction to stop construction of state park on holy site). 
146 374 U.S. 398 (1963). See supra notes 43-54 and accompanying text. 
147 406 U.S. 205 (1972). See supra notes 55-67 and accompanying text. 
14" See, e.g., Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n, 480 U.S. 136 (1987); Thomas v. 
Review Ed., 450 U.S. 707 (1981). 
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in the Coconino National Forest. 149 Because there was evidence that 
the expansion would expose an important religious tenet of the tribe 
as a myth, it threatened to destroy the tribe's cultural fabric. 150 The 
Wilson court found that, although the religious claim was sincere 
and the plaintiffs' religious practices would be hampered severely, 
the Indians did not establish a burden under the Sherbert test151 
because the government did not deny them access to their holy 
ground. 152 
Similarly, in Crow v. Gullet, the Lakota Indians charged that using 
Bear Butte in South Dakota's Black Hills as a state park interfered 
with a religious ritual commonly known as a "Vision Quest. "153 In a 
terse opinion affirming the lower court's resolution of the strict 
scrutiny balancing test in South Dakota's favor, the Eighth Circuit 
concluded that, although the government burdened the plaintiffs' 
rights, South Dakota's compelling state interest outweighed those 
rights. 154 The State's interests were compelling in several areas: the 
preservation of the environment; the protection and welfare of park 
visitors; and the improvement of public access to a unique geological 
formation. 155 
Two other cases involved the federal government's plans to build 
dams on sacred Native American land. In Badoni v. Higginson, 
Navajo plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief under the 
free exercise clause, objecting to the federal government's impound-
ing of water to form Lake Powell. 156 The Navajos claimed that: the 
149 708 F.2d 735, 739 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 956 (1983). 
150Id. at 740-41 n.2. As the chairperson of the Hopi Tribe explained: 
If the ski resort remains or is expanded, our people will not accept the view that 
this is the sacred Home of the Kachinas [the Creator's emissaries]. The basis of our 
existence as a society will become a mere fairy tale to our people. If our people no 
longer possess this long-held belief and way of life, which will inevitably occur with 
the continued presence of the ski resort ... a direct and negative impact upon our 
religious practices [will result]. The destruction of these practices will also destroy 
our present way of life and culture. 
Id. (quoting the direct testimony of Abbott Sekaquaptewa, Chairman of Hopi Tribe). 
151 See supra notes 50-51 and accompanying text. The Sherbert test requires plaintiffs to 
show that a governmental action burdens religious expression by coercing plaintiffs to engage 
in or forgo a religious practice. 
152 Wilson, 708 F.2d at 744. "The Forest Service, however, has not denied the plaintiffs 
access to the [San Francisco] Peaks, but instead permits them free entry onto the peaks and 
does not interfere with their ceremonies or the collection of ceremonial objects." Id. 
153 Crow v. Gullet, 706 F.2d 856-57 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 977 (1983). 
154 Id. at 858. 
155 Id. These interests hardly seem of the "highest order," the kind Justice Burger deemed 
necessary to override the Indians' religious claims in Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 
718 (1981). 
156 638 F.2d 172, 176 (10th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 594 (1981). 
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lake's formation on former desert land would result in the drowning 
of their gods; that the water level would deny them access to sacred 
land; and that the increased tourist volume would lead to desecration 
of sacred sites. 157 The Badoni court applied the Yoder test, and relied 
on a prior judicial determination in an unrelated action to conclude 
that the federal government had a compelling interest in the Lake 
Powell dam's power-generating capabilities. 158 The court concluded 
that granting the plaintiffs "affirmative action"159 would violate the 
establishment clause of the first amendment. 160 
The Cherokee Tribe's claim in Sequoyah v. Tennessee Valley 
Authority161 resembled the Navajo's claim in Badoni. Sequoyah in-
volved a class-action suit seeking an injunction to stop the completion 
of the Tellico Dam on the Little Tennessee River and the flooding of 
the area behind it.162 As in Badoni, the Sequoyah plaintiffs alleged 
that their sacred sites would be destroyed. 163 Additionally, the Cher-
okees felt that: their burial sites would be disturbed; their medicine 
men would lose their power; their people would lose the knowledge 
that was derived from the valley; and the altering of nature would 
be an affront to a religion that stressed the importance of living in 
harmony with nature. 164 Although the Sixth Circuit expressed its 
respect for the Cherokees' sincere beliefs, the court nonetheless held 
that the plaintiffs failed to establish that worship at this particular 
site was inseparable from their way of life. 165 
In 1986, however, the Ninth Circuit, in Northwest Indian Ceme-
tery Protective Association v. Peterson,166 upheld an injunction 
granted on behalf of the Indian plaintiffs' free exercise rights. The 
Supreme Court granted certiorari, which it had refused to do in four 
previous instances, and applied the Yoder doctrine to American In-
dians. 167 
Despite the apparent teaching of Yoder and its progeny, the Su-
preme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit and announced its decision 
157 [d. at 176. 
158 [d. at 177 (citing Friends of the Earth v. Armstrong, 485 F.2d 1 (10th Cir. 1973), cert. 
denied, 414 U.S. 1171 (1974)). 
159 [d. at 178. 
160 [d. The establishment clause prohibits the federal government from taking action to 
further the establishment of a religion. See supra note 42. 
161 620 F.2d 1159 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 953 (1980). 
162 [d. at 1160. 
163 [d. at 1162. 
164 [d. 
165 [d. at 1164. 
166 795 F.2d 688 (9th Cir. 1986). 
167 The Court denied certiorari in Wilson, Sequoyah, Badoni, and Crow. 
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in Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Association. 168 In 
so doing, the Court refused to extend the same protection to Native 
American Indians as it had to the Amish and to other groups prac-
ticing traditional Western religions. 169 Justice O'Connor, writing for 
the five-member majority in Lyng, refused to reach the constitu-
tional free exercise question and its concomitant strict scrutiny test, 
relying instead on the minimum rationality test developed by Chief 
Justice Burger in Bowen v. Roy.170 
The facts and issues presented in Lyng are typical of those in-
volved in other Indian cases.l7l The Forest Service planned to build 
a seventy-five mile road, linking the California towns of Gasquet and 
Orleans. 172 Part of this project included the upgrading of a forty-
nine mile, unpaved road that ran through the Six Rivers National 
Forest. 173 A six mile segment of this road passed through the Chim-
ney Rock section of the forest, land that three Indian tribes had 
used for the performance of religious rituals for hundreds of years. 174 
In response to comments it received on a draft Environmental 
Impact Statement175 concerning the project, the Forest Service com-
missioned a study to measure the impact that the road's completion 
would have on those tribes: the Yurock, Karok, and Tolowa.176 The 
four-hundred page study, known as the Theodoratus Report,177 con-
cluded that constructing the road would cause "serious and irrepar-
able damage to the sacred areas which [were] an integral and nec-
essary part of the belief systems and lifeway of Northwest California 
Indian peoples."178 The report concluded that the Forest Service 
should not build the road along the proposed route. 179 The Forest 
Service, however, disregarded this recommendation. 180 
168 108 S. Ct. 1319 (1988). 
169 Yoder, 406 U.S. 234 (1982). 
170 476 U.S. 693, 707-08 (1986). O'Connor adhered to the Bowen test, even though she had 
criticized the test in her separate opinion in Bowen. [d. at 727 (O'Connor, J., dissenting in 
part). 
171 See, e.g., Wilson v. Block, 708 F.2d 735 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 956 (1983); 
Badoni v. Higginson, 638 F.2d 172 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 954 (1981); Sequoyah v. 
Tennessee Valley Auth., 620 F.2d 1159 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 953 (1980). 
172 Lyng, 108 S. Ct. 1319, 1321 (1988). 
173 [d. The Forest is composed of federally owned land that adjoins the Hoopa Valley Indian 
Reservation. 
174 [d. 
175 This draft statement is mandated by NEPA, 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1982). 
176 Lyng, 108 S.Ct. at 1332. 
177 D. Theodoratus, Cultural Resources of the Chimney Rock Section Gasquet-Orleans Road, 
Six Rivers National Forest (1979) [hereinafter Theodoratus ReportJ. The Theodoratus Report 
is named for its author. 
178 Lyng, 108 S. Ct. at 1322 (quoting Theodoratus Report, supra note 177, at 182). 
179 [d. 
180 [d. at 1322. 
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Although an effort was made to relocate the road along a route 
that avoided "archeological" sites, as well as those used in contem-
porary religious rituals, the Forest Service rejected alternative plans 
that would have avoided the area entirely.181 The alternative plans 
damaged the Indians' sacred grounds less, but were more expensive 
and less practical because they involved private land purchases and 
soil stability problems. Additionally, the Forest Service granted 
permits for significant logging operations in this a!'ea, while allowing 
for one-half mile protective zones around Indian religious sites. 182 
This logging would further destroy the pristine setting vital to the 
tribe's religious practices. 183 
The Indian tribes and organizations affected by the plan brought 
suit in federal district court and obtained a permanent injunction 
prohibiting the Forest Service from building the road or implement-
ing the timber management plan. 184 The Indians brought their claim 
under the free exercise clause as well as several federal environ-
mental statutes, including the Clean Water Act185 and NEPA.186 The 
Ninth Circuit upheld the injunction. 187 While the appeal was pending 
before the Ninth Circuit, Congress passed the California Wilderness 
Act,188 which protected much of the area in question. 189 Congress 
exempted the strip of land designated for the road from the Act's 
regulation, however, with the intent to leave resolution of that ques-
tion to the responsible authorities. 190 
In overturning the Ninth Circuit's decision, the Court refused to 
accept the Indians' assertion that the Forest Service's decision bur-
dened the Indians' rights to such an extent that the government 
should be prohibited from carrying out its plan unless it could show 
a compelling interest. 191 Instead, Justice O'Connor, although con-
181 [d. 
182 [d. 
183 Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n v. Peterson, 795 F.2d. 688, 692 (9th Cir. 
1986). Even though protective zones would be established around the religious sites, the 
Indians consider the entire area sacred. Any destruction of nature is therefore a desecration 
of their holy place. See id. at 690. 
184 See Northwest Indian Cemetery Ass'n v. Peterson, 565 F. Supp 586, 606 (N.D. Cal. 
1983). 
185 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). 
186 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). 
187 Peterson, 795 F.2d at 698. 
188 16 U.S.C. §§ 543-543h (Supp. IV 1986). 
189 Lyng, 108 S. Ct. 1319, 1323 (1988) (citing S. REP. No. 582, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 29 
(1984». The Act pn:tected the entire area as a wilderness area, but exempted the strip of 
land on which the road was to be built. [d. 
190 [d. at 1323. 
191 [d. at 1324. 
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vinced of the sincerity of the Indians' beliefs and concerned about 
the serious adverse effects on the Indians' ability to practice their 
religion,192 found that the Constitution provided no remedy for the 
Indians. 193 
The Court explained that its holding in Bowen had established 
that the free exercise clause does not require "the Government [sic] 
to conduct its own internal affairs in ways that comport with the 
religious beliefs of particular citizens."194 The situation in Lyng, the 
Court continued, could not be meaningfully distinguished from the 
facts in Bowen. 195 The Court noted that the plaintiffs' claim involved 
far more serious consequences than in Bowen,196 but decided that it 
was estopped from addressing the issue of severity by the Court's 
prohibition against evaluating the quality of a party's religious claim 
articulated in Hobbie v. Unemployment Compensation Commis-
sion. 197 
The Court then distinguished Lyng from Sherbert v. Verner and 
its progeny by asserting that the Court found for the plaintiffs in 
those cases because the challenged governmental actions prohibited 
the free exercise of religion. 198 Although the Court acknowledged 
that the road's construction could have devastating effects on tra-
ditional Indian practices and would render the continuation of those 
practices virtually impossible,199 it concluded that the free exercise 
clause afforded the Indians no protection because the government 
did not coerce the Indians to abandon their practices. 20o Thus, the 
Court shifted from a test that analyzes whether governmental action 
prohibits a religious practice to a more stringent test that requires 
some act of governmental coercion before free exercise claims will 
be adjudicated in favor of a plaintiff. 
Finally, O'Connor voiced concern over the diminution of federal 
sovereignty rights. 201 The Court concluded that upholding the in-
192Id. 
193 I d. at 1326-27. 
194 Id. at 1325 (quoting Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 699 (1986». 
195Id. Bowen, as previously discussed, involved two Native American Indians who claimed 
that the government's issuance and dissemination of a social security number for their daughter 
violated that child's rights under the free exercise clause. See supra notes 81-101 and accom-
panying text. The Bowen Court concluded that the plaintiffs could not prevail because the 
action complained of was merely an internal governmental mechanism. 476 U.S. at 700. 
196 See Lyng, 108 S. Ct. at 1325. 
197Id. See Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n, 480 U.S. 136, 144 n.9 (1987). 
198 Lyng, 108 E'. Ct. at 1326. 
199Id. 
200Id. at 1326-27. 
201 Id. at 1327. 
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junction could vest the Indians with de facto beneficial ownership of 
the land in question. 202 Because the injunction was based on the 
Indians' need to practice their religion in privacy, the Court specu-
lated that, at some point, the Indians might seek to exclude every-
body, even recreational users, from federally owned land. 203 
Justice Brennan wrote a powerful dissent in Lyng, criticizing the 
majority's constitutional analysis. 204 Brennan found the burden im-
posed by the Forest Service action indistinguishable from the burden 
condemned in Wisconsin v. Yoder,205 Sherbert v. Verner,206 and their 
progeny. Brennan noted that the free exercise clause is directed 
against any form of governmental action that inhibits religious prac-
tice. 207 Brennan claimed that the majority erred in finding that no 
burden existed simply because the government did not "prohibit" 
anything. 208 
Brennan also found the facts in Lyng distinguishable from Bowen 
v. Roy209 because the Forest Service decision had external effects 
that the action in Bowen did not have. 2lO He then criticized the Court 
for allowing its concern about property rights to preempt a substan-
tive constitutional analysis. 211 Finally, Brennan advocated the use of 
a new balancing test for resolving future claims. 212 Under this test, 
plaintiffs would be required to show the "centrality" of the practices 
or beliefs being prohibited before the government must show a 
compelling interest. 213 
VI. THE FEDERAL COURTS' MISHANDLING OF L YNG AND OTHER 
NATIVE AMERICAN CLAIMS 
Although the Court found Lyng and Bowen indistinguishable, the 
factual situation in Lyng is quite different from that in Bowen. In 
202Id. 
203 Id. 
204 See generally id. at 1330-40 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan's opinion was 
joined by Justices Marshall and Blackmun. 
205 406 U.S. 205 (1972). See supra notes 55-63 and accompanying text. 
206 374 U.S. 398 (1963). See supra notes 43-54 and accompanying text. In so doing, Brennan 
devoted several parts to a discussion of the nature of Native American religions. Lyng, 108 
S. Ct. 1331-33. 
207 Lyng, 108 S. Ct. at 1330. 
208 I d. at 1335. 
209 476 U.S. 693 (1986). See supra notes 81-101 and accompanying text. 
210 Lyng, 108 S. Ct. at 1336. 
211 Id. at 1337-38. 
212 I d. at 1338-39. 
213Id. 
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Bowen, the contested governmental action, the use of a social se-
curity number, was purely an internal governmental matter. The 
Lyng case, on the other hand, involved governmental proposals that 
actively interfered with the plaintiffs' religious use of federally 
owned land. As the Theodoratus Report concluded, the "successful 
use of the [area was] dependent upon and facilitated by certain 
qualities of the physical environment, the most important of which 
[were] privacy, silence, and an undisturbed natural setting."214 
Furthermore, because Indian religions revolve around the concept 
of sacred geography, making the rituals site-specific, the entire re-
ligious life of three tribes was threatened.215 Thus, the construction 
of the road would eventually destroy much of the tribal social system, 
because the performance of Indian religious rituals cannot be sepa-
rated from the social and cultural aspects of Indian life.216 
The Lyng Court, however, refused to evaluate the severity of the 
consequences to the Indians, writing that it was prohibited from 
doing so by its previous holding in Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals 
Commission.217 The language from Hobbie that the Court cited, 
however, concerns the evaluation of a religious claim's sincerity, not 
the severity of the consequences of a violative action. 218 The Hobbie 
Court wrote that it was intrusive to question a person's reasons for 
adopting religious beliefs, adding nothing about severity of conse-
quences. 
The Lyng Court distinguished Lyng from Sherbert, Yoder, and 
their progeny. In so doing, O'Connor implied that the government 
was not prohibiting anything in Lyng, but was merely engaging in 
an action with incidental effects that might make it more difficult for 
the Indians to practice their religion. 219 By refusing to find the 
Indians' free exercise rights unburdened, even while acknowledging 
that the road-building and logging would render future religious 
practice impossible, O'Connor applied a more stringent test in that 
it required an act of purposeful governmental coercion. Clearly, a 
214 Id. at 1332 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Theodoratus Report, supra note 177, at 
181). 
215 See id. at 1331-32 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
216 Id. (quoting AIRFA Hearings, supra note 124, at 86 (statement of Barney Old Coyote 
of the Crow Tribe)). 
217 Id. at 1325; see Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n, 480 U.S. 136, 144 n.9 (1987) 
(quoting United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 87-88 (1944)). 
218 Hobbie, 480 U.S. at 144 n.9. The Court pointed to the following language: "If judicial 
inquiry into the truth of one's religious beliefs would violate the free exercise clause, an 
inquiry into one's reasons for adopting those beliefs is similarly intrusive." 
219 Lyng, 108 S. Ct. at 1326-27. 
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governmental action can render religious practice impossible without 
such coercion. Forced cessation of a religious practice is the evil 
against which the first amendment should protect. It is inapposite 
that the free exercise clause should protect against the means but 
not the results of governmental interference with religious freedom. 
Consequently, first amendment protection should extend to such 
situations. 
The Court's refusal to follow the Yoder test is unjustified, because, 
as a careful comparison of the Lyng case and prior doctrine laid down 
by the Court reveals, Lyng is not truly distinguishible from Yoder 
and Sherbert. As Justice Brennan pointed out in his dissent in Lyng, 
the Court had no basis for finding that the burden imposed by the 
governmental action in Lyng was distinguishible from burdens im-
posed in earlier cases. The first amendment guarantee does not 
distinguish between types of restraints on religious exercise. Rather, 
the free exercise clause applies to any form of governmental action 
that frustrates or inhibits religious practice. 220 Indeed, the Yoder 
Court struck down the Wisconsin compulsory education statute be-
cause of the impact that compulsory school attendance might have 
on the continued survival of the Amish communities. 221 The Indians 
in Lyng requested that the Court enjoin the governmental action for 
exactly the same reason. 222 
Other similarities exist between Yoder and Lyng. The Indians' 
religion in Lyng, like that of the Amish in Yoder, was ancient. 223 The 
governmental action involved in Lyng was undeniably at odds with 
the fundamental tenets of the Indians' beliefs,224 just as Wisconsin's 
laws offended the Amish beliefs. 225 Perhaps the most significant 
similarity, however, is the relationship between the Amish and In-
dian societies and their respective religions. The role of religion in 
Native American Indian life is pervasive and cannot be separated 
from other aspects of the Indian social structure. 226 Chief Justice 
Burger considered the inseverability of religion and culture in Yoder, 
220 I d. at 1330. 
221 Id. at 1334 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 209 
(1972». 
222 See id. at 1334-35; see also Lyng Brief, supra note 18, at 63-64 & n.36 (quoting 
Theodoratus Report, supra note 177, at 194-95) (road construction directly impacts Indians' 
social fabric). 
223 See Yoder, 406 U.S. at 218 n.9; Lyng, 108 S. Ct. at 1330 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
224 Lyng, 108 S. Ct. at 1333 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
225 Yoder, 406 U.S. at 218. 
226 See supra notes 17-35 and accompanying text. 
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where he was concerned about the severity of the consequences of 
mandatory school attendance to Amish society. 227 
Based upon this relationship, the Court in Yoder concluded that 
the governmental action would undermine the entire community and 
would force the Amish to be assimilated into mainstream society. 228 
Thus, in Yoder, the Court concluded that the Amish needed to be 
protected against governmental conduct that failed to serve suffi-
ciently compelling ends. 229 Although the strict scrutiny analysis ap-
plied in Yoder seems equally appropriate in Lyng,230 Justice O'Con-
nor nonetheless refused to apply it. 231 O'Connor relied instead on 
Bowen, which resembles Lyng only in that it involves Native Amer-
ican religious claims. The resemblance does not reach any further. 
Because the Lyng Court refused to reach the constitutiGlial free 
exercise question and apply the Yoder balancing test, the Court's 
analysis unfortunately ended without a full first amendment analysis. 
Had the Court applied the Yoder test, however, it is clear that it 
would not have found the government's interest in building the road 
sufficiently compelling. 232 In Lyng, the government prevailed only 
because the Court applied a minimum rationality test to the govern-
ment's actions. Chief Justice Burger applied such a test in Bowen 
and, although Justice O'Connor criticized that test in a separate 
opinion, she nonetheless utilized the test in Lyng. 233 
If the Lyng Court had reached the Yoder test, it could have 
addressed properly the importance of the government's rights. 
There is, certainly, some validity to the Court's concern for federal 
sovereignty. After all, none of the cases involving Western religions 
concerned the use of government-owned land. 234 It is obviously not 
227 406 u.s. at 210. Burger noted, "[bJroadly speaking, the Old Order Amish religion 
pervades and determines the entire mode of life of its adherents." 
228 I d. at 218. 
229Id. at 234. 
230 Indeed, the doctrine of stare decisis seems to compel the Court to apply such an analysis. 
231 Lyng, 108 S. Ct. at 1324. 
232 See id. at 1337 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan cites the district court's reliance 
on the Theodoratus Report's conclusion that the road was unimportant and did not represent 
a compelling interest. Id. at 1336. 
233 See Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 727 (1986) (O'Connor, J., dissenting in part). "Such a 
test has no basis in precedent and relegates a serious First Amendment value to the barest 
level of minimal scrutiny that the Equal Protection Clause already provides." I d. In fact, five 
justices expressly rejected such a standard in Bowen, see supra notes 93-96 and accompanying 
text, and the Court refused to adopt the test in Thomas. See supra notes 105-107 and 
accompanying text. 
234 One other case also suggests that site-specific Western religions claiming that a particular 
plot of land or building will be accorded first amendment protection, although the plaintiffs 
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desirable for the courts to allow plaintiffs to dictate how the govern-
ment uses its land. The Court could easily avoid creating dangerous 
precedent, however, by crafting a carefully worded, narrowly tai-
lored opinion, stating that the Court intended only to limit the Forest 
Service's discretion in the land's use and not to vest de facto own-
ership in the Indians. 
It is disturbing that the Supreme Court and the lower federal 
courts refuse to extend to Native American Indians the strict scru-
tiny protection developed for the Amish, Jehovah's Witnesses, and 
Seventh Day Adventists. This phenomenon is troubling because it 
suggests that an unintentional yet pervasive institutional racism is 
at work undermining the Indians' claims. 
When examined in the context of the unique nature of Native 
American religion, the application of the Burger minimum rationality 
test is particularly inappropriate. The Indians' religion is inextrica-
bly tied to their social and cultural lives,235 and thus threats to the 
free exercise of Indian religion are especially pernicious. Further, 
Native American Indians are a politically powerless, discrete and 
insular minority, as defined by the Carolene Products footnote. 236 
Native American religions should be entitled to receive at least the 
same, if not a greater, degree of protection as their Western coun-
terparts. Yet, by applying a standard of mere minimum rationality 
to governmental actions interfering with Native American religious 
rights, the Court actually affords Native Americans less protection. 
In fact, the minimum rationality standard applied to the govern-
mental action in Lyng is the Court's lowest level of judicial scru-
tiny. 237 
were not Indians. See Pillar of Fire v. Denver Urban Renewal Auth., 509 P.2d 1250 (Colo. 
1973). In Pillar of Fire, the Colorado Supreme Court concluded under the free exercise clause 
and Yoder that the Urban Renewal Authority could not condemn the building that was the 
founding place of an offshoot of the Methodist Church without a full hearing at which the 
Authority would have to prove its compelling interest in the property. 
235 AIRFA Hearings, supra note 33, at 86 (statement of Barney Old Coyote of the Crow 
Tribe). 
236 United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938). 
237 Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n, 480 U.S. 136, 141-42 (1987) (quoting Bowen 
v. Roy, 476 U.S. at 727 (O'Connor, J., dissenting in part». 
In general, there are three levels of judicial scrutiny applied in constitutional analysis. Strict 
scrutiny is the highest form, under which the government must justify its objective as the 
least restricitve means of accomplishing a compelling governmental interest. See L. TRIBE, 
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (2nd. ed. 1988) § 16-6, 1451. Under intermediate or height-
ened scrutiny, a court will defer to an important governmental objective. See id. at 1443. 
Finally, minimum scrutiny requires only that the governmental action be rationally based. 
See id. at 1439. 
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Additionally, AIRF A manifests unequivocal congressional intent 
to protect Native American religion. 238 When claims are brought 
pursuant to AIRF A, courts should evaluate executive agencies' ac-
tions in light of this intent. An examination of lower court cases 
illustrates how courts have mishandled Native American claims 
based on a lack of understanding and appreciation for Native Amer-
ican religions. While none of these lower court cases has presented 
a factual situation as favorable to the plaintiffs as the one in Lyng,239 
each addressed a valid claim. With the exception of Badoni v. Hig-
ginson, which, in the immediate aftermath of the worst energy crisis 
in the nation's history,240 held that the generation of energy was a 
compelling governmental interest, each decision in these cases re-
veals a reluctance to accord Native American religious claims the 
same level of judicial scrutiny that is granted to Western religious 
claims. 
Sequoyah v. Tennessee Valley Authority241 provides an example 
of a court ignoring AIRF A's congressional intent. By dismissing the 
Native American claims as mere personal preferences,242 the Se-
quoyah Court showed a fundamental misunderstanding of the in-
tensely site-specific nature of Indian religions. In allowing the dam's 
construction, the Sixth Circuit showed a complete disregard for the 
recently passed American Indian Religious Freedom Act. 
The Wilson v. Block court, on the other hand, reached the AIRF A 
question, but resolved it in the government's favor. 243 The Wilson 
court looked to AIRF A's legislative history and found that, because 
Congress intended only that Indian religions be treated the same 
as, but not better than, majoritarian religions, the statute did not 
improve the Indians' case. 244 Further, the Wilson court indicated 
that AIRF A required only that federal agencies take Indian religious 
238 42 U. s. c. § 1996 (1980). 
239 Lyng is the strongest of all the Indian cases because of the severity of the consequences 
to tribal culture and the relative unimportance of the road and the proposed logging. 
240 Badoni, which concerned the flooding of sacred land behind a dam suitable for generating 
electric power, was decided by the district court in 1977 and by the Tenth Circuit in 1980. 
Because the case was heard following the oil embargo inspired energy crisis of the mid-1970s, 
the construction of facilities suitable for the generation of hydro-electric power must have 
seemed a relatively compelling governmental interest. Further, the case was also decided 
against the backdrop of chronic water shortages in the rapidly expanding, arid Southwest. 
241 Sequoyah v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 629 F.2d 1159 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 953 
(1980). 
242 [d. at 1164. 
243 Wilson v. Block, 708 F.2d 735, 746 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 956 (1983). 
244 [d. at 746; see also Civil Rights Commission Report, supra note 17, at 32. 
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beliefs into account when evaluating land management decisions. 245 
In its view, AIRF A did not require that those decisions be specifi-
cally tailored to suit the Indians. 246 
The Wilson and Sequoyah courts each failed to recognize the true 
nature of Indian religions. Consequently, they did not assess cor-
rectly either the magnitude of the burden placed on the Indians' 
abilities to practice their religion or the associated threats to Native 
American culture. This failure occurred despite AIRF A's policy re-
quiring a basic appreciation of Indian religions by federal agencies 
that examine Indian religious claims. As the United States Civil 
Rights Commission observed, "in cases in which the court must 
determine whether the belief seeking protection is central to the 
religion of the plaintiff, the judiciary is generally predisposed to the 
Western tradition. "247 
VII. PEOPLE V. WOODY: ONE COURT'S EFFORT TO RESOLVE 
NATIVE AMERICAN CLAIMS IN A WESTERN CONTEXT 
In one case a court resolved a Native American free exercise claim 
consistent with free exercise precedent: People v. Woody.248 Woody, 
decided in 1964 by the California Supreme Court, a court with great 
ideological differences from the contemporary federal bench, is an 
excellent example of a proper way for courts to resolve these 
claims. 249 In Woody, the California Court held that a law outlawing 
the possession of peyote, a hallucinogen, violated the free exercise 
rights of Native Americans who use peyote as an integral part of 
religious rituals. 250 
The Woody court upheld the use of peyote for two reasons. First, 
the use of peyote resembles the use of sacramental wine in Western 
religion. 251 The court noted that the National Prohibition Act ex-
empted sacramental wine and the court applied this rationale in 
allowing the Indians to continue to use peyote in their religious 
rituals. 252 Second, the court looked at the differences between Indian 
245 Wilson, 708 F.2d at 746. 
246 [d. at 746. "AIRFA does not require Native traditional religious considerations always 
[to] prevail to the exclusion of all else." (citation omitted). [d. 
247 Civil Rights Commission Report, supra note 17, at 32. 
248 40 Cal. Rptr. 69, 394 P.2d 813 (1964). 
249 The California Court is reputed to be one of the Nation's most progressive benches. 
Importantly, courts in the 1960s led the civil rights movement by expanding and protecting 
minority rights. In the 1980s, the judicial trend is to limit civil rights. 
250 Woody, 40 Cal. Rptr. at 71, 394 P.2d at 815. 
251 [d. at 77, 394 P.2d at 821. 
252 [d. (citing the National Prohibition Act, Title II, § 3 (1919), 41 Stat. 308-09) (repealed)). 
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and Western religions and resolved the strict scrutiny balancing test 
in the Indians' favor: 
The varying currents of the subcultures that flow into the main-
stream of our national life give it depth and beauty. We preserve 
a greater value than an ancient tradition when we protect the 
rights of the Indians who honestly practiced an old religion in 
using peyote one night at a meeting in a desert hogan near 
Needles, California. 253 
The California Supreme Court's decision in People v. Woody re-
veals the insight and honesty that courts need to properly resolve 
Indian religious claims. If a court makes the effort to understand 
the nature of Indian religions and the pervasive role they play in 
Indian societies, it will likely make appropriate use of the Yoder 
balancing test. More importantly, if a court can devise an analogy 
that allows it to recognize the Indians' burden in terms of a Western 
religion, perhaps it will more ably resolve the free exercise ques-
tions. 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
I t is difficult to explain the federal courts' reluctance to apply the 
Yoder and Sherbert tests even-handedly to include Native American 
religious claims. Examination of those claims, and of existing doc-
trine, shows a fundamental misunderstanding of the nature of Indian 
claims and possibly an unintentional, institutional racism perpetu-
ated by the judiciary. It is troubling when the federal circuits, with-
out exception, resolve the balancing test in favor of governmental 
property interests rather than Native Americans' constitutional 
rights. The Supreme Court's recent adoption of a minimum scrutiny 
test in Lyng is far more disturbing because it precludes federal 
courts from reaching a balancing test in most cases and virtually 
assures that Indian plaintiffs will not prevail over federal property 
interests. 
An appropriate analysis for the Lyng case would require a court 
to adopt the Woody court's methodology and analogize the Indians' 
sacred land to Western religions' sacred sites, usually designated by 
buildings, which are indispensible to the practice of the religion. 254 
After making such an analogy, a court would consider whether the 
253 [d. at 77-78, 394 P.2d at 821-22. 
254 Examples of such sites are St. Peter's Basilica in Rome, the Western Wall in Jerusalem, 
and the Dome of the Rock in Jerusalem. 
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first amendment rights of a religious group would be affected if the 
group's holy site came under the federal government's control and 
the government proposed putting the property to a use inconsistent 
with the continued practice of the religion. 
In such a scenario, the government would not prohibit the practice 
of the religion. Rather, it would merely burden that practice. If the 
group could establish the burden, the government would have to 
prove a compelling interest achieved by the least restrictive means 
available in order to justify, say, building a road through a cathedral, 
mosque, or synagogue. Such an analysis would allow the courts to 
follow the doctrine they have developed for other religions, while 
also taking the intent of AIRF A and the mandate of the judicial 
doctrine of the Carolene Products footnote into account. 
